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The Great Kiwi (Dis)Connect: The New 
Provinces Act of 1858 and its Consequences1 
 
In 1853, New Zealand began a quasi-federal experiment that ended 
surprisingly quickly. New Zealand’s Pakeha (white) settlers, many 
influenced by the Chartist movement, had migrated in the 
expectation that they would possess the same rights as Englishmen at 
home. After vociferous agitation and a false start when an earlier 
constitution was blocked as unworkable, they were granted a 
representative constitution that contained a system of six provinces.2 
Five of the provinces quickly established ministries that were wholly 
or partially responsible to the legislature, and responsible government 
at the national level followed in 1856. 3  Although responsible 
government followed similar lines to that in the Australian colonies, 
governors retained the power to veto financial bills and Australia had 
no equivalent to New Zealand’s provincial system or its 
superintendents, some of whom viewed the superintendency as akin 
to a lieutenant-governorship. In the same decade that New Zealand’s 
provincial system began, similar upheavals occurred across the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This article is an expanded version of a paper I presented at the Australian 
Historical Association’s ‘Connections’ conference in Adelaide on 13 July 2012. 
My thanks to Stuart Macintyre and Patricia Grimshaw for their meticulous 
proofreading and advice, my partner Charlotte Whild for her patience and 
feedback (and the loan of her laptop at a crucial time), two anonymous reviewers 
whose positive and encouraging comments were of considerable help to me, and 
the good people at PapersPast of the National Library of New Zealand. Their 
digitisation of numerous newspapers and the content I discovered within them 
inspired my interest in this topic. 
2 For more on the abortive 1846 Constitution Act, which provided far too much 
legislative machinery for a small colony and was resisted by Governor George 
Grey, see A.H. McLintock, Crown Colony Government in New Zealand 
(Wellington: R.E. Owen, Government Printer, 1958), 286-93. 
3 Otago’s first act was to create a responsible ministry; Wellington and Nelson 
passed similar measures; Auckland and Canterbury created partially responsible 
ministries; cautious Taranaki chose to wait until national responsible government 
was granted. See Otago Witness, 14 January 1854, 3; Wellington Independent, 5 
November 1853, 3; and New Zealand Parliamentary Record, 2nd ed., ed. Guy H. 
Scholefield (Wellington: R.E. Owen, Government Printer, 1950 [1913]), 179, 
187, 209, 229. 
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Tasman when Victoria and Queensland were separated from New 
South Wales. Although they were established as separate colonies 
rather than simply as provinces within a federal colony, their reasons 
for separation closely resemble those used to justify both a provincial 
system in New Zealand and the secession of four new provinces from 
the six original ones. 
 
The dispersed, isolated nature of New Zealand’s settlement meant 
that government required a localised component, some form of 
provincial or municipal structure. Six main settlements and a 
smattering of smaller coastal footholds huddled between dangerous 
harbours and largely unknown hinterlands. All six were young; 
Wellington was established first, with an advance party arriving in 
September 1839 ahead of the first settlers in January 1840, while 
Christchurch was the youngest, settled in December 1850. Five were 
founded as Wakefieldian settlements by the New Zealand Company 
and subsidiaries; the sixth, Auckland, was the ‘official’ British 
settlement. The 27,633 inhabitants of these towns were outnumbered 
more than two-to-one by 63,107 Maori, whose land was coveted by 
Pakeha. 4  Despite the small and marginal nature of the Pakeha 
settlements, it was quite impractical to govern New Zealand from one 
centre. The need for more localised government had already been 
acknowledged during crown colony administration.5 All six of the 
main settlements were separated from their nearest neighbour by at 
least a tedious week-long coastal voyage by sailboat, although this was 
preferable to an overland trek. Even the introduction of steamships in 
1854 did not solve this problem; Otago in particular was visited 
rarely—only three times in 1854-55—and when the steamer did call, 
travellers to Auckland faced a ‘quick’ voyage of two to four weeks.6 
Most of the Wakefieldian settlements were in closer contact with 
Australia than with Auckland. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Statistics New Zealand, ‘A1.1 Total Population’, Long Term Data Series: A. 
Population, available from 
http://www.stats.govt.nz/browse_for_stats/economic_indicators/NationalAccoun
ts/long-term-data-series/population.aspx; accessed 19 June 2012. 
5 McLintock, Crown Colony Government in New Zealand, 319. 
6 Eric Pawson, ‘Time-Space Convergence in New Zealand, 1850s to 1990s’, New 
Zealand Journal of Geography 94, 1 (October 1992), 16. 
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To satisfy New Zealand’s need for a substantial measure of local self-
government, the British parliament—on the recommendation of 
Governor George Grey—included a system of six provinces in the 
1852 Constitution Act that conferred responsible government.7 The 
provinces were centred upon the main sites of colonisation and 
provincial governments enjoyed wide powers of legislation. Thirteen 
subjects were reserved for the exclusive control of the central 
government’s General Assembly, most notably Maori relations, 
customs duties, and most aspects of criminal law. The General 
Assembly was bicameral, but the six provinces were granted a 
unicameral council and a separate elected superintendent. The 
relationship between superintendents and councils was very similar to 
that between governors and colonial legislatures. As the central 
government retained control over the alienation and management of 
Maori land, Maori were largely excluded from the provincial project. 
Only a few Maori satisfied the property qualification to vote and their 
government dealings generally continued to be conducted via agents 
of the central government—though these agents sometimes also had 
provincial responsibilities. The Pakeha population did not pass sixty 
thousand and eclipse the Maori population until 1858, and the 
political architecture of the Constitution Act was a cumbersome system 
for a small colony.8 Nonetheless, it was popular and expanded quickly 
as the spread of settlement demonstrated that the initial provincial 
boundaries were defective. The number of provinces grew, ultimately 
to ten, though only nine existed simultaneously. 
 
The provinces, like Australia’s new colonies, were important. Settlers 
were often more concerned with provincial politics than they were 
with distant dealings in the national capital—Auckland until 1865, 
and then Wellington. To this day, the Australian states remain 
important political units. Yet in 1876 the provinces ceased to exist 
and New Zealand remains a unitary rather than federal state. The 
only obvious remnants of provincialism to twenty-first-century New 
Zealanders are the Anniversary Day public holidays, which do not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 For the full text of the Constitution Act, see The New Zealand Constitution Act: 
Together With Correspondence Between the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the 
Governor-in-Chief of New Zealand in Explanation Thereof (Wellington: R. Stokes, 
1853), available from http://nzetc.victoria.ac.nz/tm/scholarly/tei-GovCons.html; 
accessed 19 June 2012. 
8 Statistics New Zealand, ‘A1.1 Total Population’. 
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always follow the former provincial borders; a fashion shop occupying 
the old Southland provincial chambers in Invercargill; and the 
Canterbury provincial chambers, heavily damaged by the 
Christchurch earthquake of February 2011. 9  How could New 
Zealand’s provincial system disappear so dramatically? An 
explanation cannot be found in size: Australia may be much larger 
than New Zealand, but other relatively small countries maintain 
federal structures, such as Austria, Switzerland, and the Federated 
States of Micronesia. Size is a lazy answer, especially as New Zealand 
possessed a considerable degree of distance in transport and 
communications well into the twentieth century. The explanation 
must lie elsewhere. 
 
One of the major factors in abolition was the New Provinces Act of 
1858, which created an essentially automatic process to enable the 
secession of new provinces. It may seem counter-intuitive to argue 
that an act creating provinces and expanding the provincial project 
contributed to its demise. However, I shall argue that the New 
Provinces Act undermined provincialism instead of promoting it. First, 
it was part of a strategy employed by centralist politicians to divide 
and rule the provinces. Second, the new provinces were weak and 
demonstrated the problems of provincialism; this was especially true 
in the case of two small South Island provinces, Marlborough and 
Southland. Third, neither new nor old provinces successfully met the 
real needs of most settlers in a young country, especially as the desired 
scale of public works was beyond the means of all but the wealthiest 
provinces. They quickly gained discontented and poorly developed 
hinterlands, overlooked at the expense of the interests of wealthy 
landowners and capital cities. The new provinces became a 
compelling argument against provincialism, and instead of promoting 
provincial sentiment, their failures caused settlers to seek redress from 
the central government and to desire national solutions to provincial 
problems. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 At the time of writing, the chambers are yet to be restored but grant money has 
been received to fund restoration work. Charlie Gates, ‘Provincial Chambers to 
Share $1M Grant’, Fairfax New Zealand, available from 
http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/christchurch-earthquake/6930848/Provincial-
chambers-to-share-1m-grant; accessed on 19 June 2012. 
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My argument is an exploration of a theme only briefly explored by 
W.P. Morrell in his authoritative history of the provincial system. 
Insofar as the New Provinces Act weakened the provincial system, he 
describes it as ‘achiev[ing] its object admirably’.10 However, Morrell 
writes from the top-down perspective of the central government and 
treats the new provinces as a kind of peripheral subplot. A deeper 
exploration of the consequences of the New Provinces Act reveals just 
how significantly it contributed to shaping and centralising New 
Zealand’s provincial institutions. In doing so, I am writing against 
the argument of historians such as B.J. Dalton and Tony Ballantyne 
that the ‘key engine for political transformation was the conflict over 
land and sovereignty that raged from the end of the 1850s through to 
the early 1870s’.11 I do not deny that conflict played a role in the 
centralisation of New Zealand statehood, but there were other major 
forces at work, one of which was the New Provinces Act. Here I 
concur with Bernard Attard’s critique of the war-as-centralisation-
impetus argument, but with a different emphasis—Attard emphasises 
the inability of the provinces to borrow money, while I aim to 
emphasise the political rivalries of the period and the inability of the 
provinces to develop.12 
 
The advent of the provinces met with general support in 1853. After 
straining for years under the perceived misrule of governors and their 
nominated councils, every settlement had the chance to handle its 
own affairs once the provincial system formally came into operation. 
When the Constitution Act arrived in New Zealand in late 1852, it 
was greeted with joy. The enthusiasm was most palpable in Dunedin, 
where: 
every exultant male colonist, literally or figuratively, flung 
his hat into the air, and rushed off to wring the hand of 
everybody he met, and to join in every form of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10  W.P. Morrell, The Provincial System in New Zealand 1852-76, 2nd ed. 
(Christchurch: Whitcombe and Tombs, 1964 [1932]), 114. 
11 The quote is from Tony Ballantyne, ‘The State, Politics and Power, 1769-1893’, 
in The New Oxford History of New Zealand, ed. Giselle Byrnes (South Melbourne: 
Oxford University Press, 2009), 112. For B.J. Dalton’s similar argument, see War 
and Politics in New Zealand 1855-1870 (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1967), 
12. 
12 Bernard Attard, ‘Making the Colonial State: Development, Debt, and Warfare in 
New Zealand, 1853-76’, Australian Economic History Review 52, no. 2 (July 
2012): 101-27, especially 101-03 and 115. 
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demonstration that the resources and enthusiasm of the 
moment could devise.13 
Salutes were fired, the First Church of Otago rang its bell, a large 
bonfire was lit; ‘all’, in the words of the settlement’s sole newspaper, 
‘seemed determined to do their utmost to welcome the tidings of the 
glorious Constitution’.14 To the north, the more reserved Lyttelton 
Times of Canterbury, one of the early colony’s most erudite 
publications, found that ‘the satisfaction expressed at the measure, 
has been general throughout the colony’ and Pakeha have dwelt ‘with 
satisfaction upon the large measure of real self-Government which it 
bestows’.15 Central to this joy was the inauguration of the provincial 
councils between July and December 1853; this was the ‘real self-
Government’ of the ‘glorious Constitution’. 
 
Settlers saw in the provincial councils the ability to pursue the public 
works and civil institutions that were desperately needed. There were 
no organised education systems; law and order provisions were 
meagre; public buildings were either poor or non-existent. Most 
infuriatingly, roads were rarely better than mud tracks, ports were 
shambolic affairs, and although most settlers had arrived in New 
Zealand in the wake of England’s ‘railway mania’, the very suggestion 
of constructing railways was financially laughable. This state of affairs 
was unacceptable and the economy of every province was hindered; it 
was difficult for settlers opening up hinterlands to get produce even 
to local markets, let alone to export. High hopes rested upon the new 
provinces, yet they quickly raised the ire of hinterland settlers for 
focusing on the interests of provincial capitals. 
 
The New Provinces Act was created in response to three regional 
movements that had petitioned the central parliament for secession 
from the provinces in which they were located. One was in the North 
Island—Wellington Province’s Hawke’s Bay region. Two were in the 
South Island—Marlborough, the eastern portion of Nelson Province, 
and Southland, fittingly enough the southern part of Otago. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 James Barr (‘An Old Identity’), The Old Identities: Being Sketches and Reminiscences 
During the First Decade of the Province of Otago, N.Z. (Dunedin: Mills, Dick and 
Co., 1879), 165. 
14 Otago Witness, 13 November 1852, 2. 
15 Lyttelton Times, 30 October 1852, 6. 
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All three regions shared similar complaints. Hawke’s Bay had the 
largest population of sheep in Wellington and was thus a major 
contributor to the provincial economy,16 yet money voted for public 
works never eventuated.17 The main centre of the region, Napier, a 
port and trading hub, was derided by the province’s upper class as 
‘Little Peddlington’.18 Southland possessed large tracts of potential 
farmland and a valuable port at Bluff, the closest in New Zealand to 
Melbourne, yet it was miserably ignored by Otago.19 A lack of land 
surveys and the failure to lay out a town at Bluff spurred rumours that 
the provincial council wanted to limit development to land further 
north.20 Conflicting ordinances regarding land purchases and leases 
culminated in a December 1856 ordinance that effectively excluded 
smallholders, the backbone of the Southland economy, from 
acquiring land.21 Marlborough was similarly under-developed by its 
provincial council—roads were scarce, not to mention impassable in 
winter, provisions were not made for education or the maintenance of 
law, and the Wairau River was the site of drownings due to the 
absence of a ferry or bridge. 22  Its secession campaign gained 
momentum when a new superintendent of Nelson was elected in 
1856 and quickly introduced land legislation hostile to the interests of 
Marlborough’s large runholders. 23  The movement did not enjoy 
unanimous support in Marlborough. As Jim McAloon has shown, 
some of its politicians and voters were sceptical of the region’s ability 
to become a viable province, but thanks to the support of non-
resident electors qualified by property, the runholders were in the 
majority.24 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Nelson Examiner, 13 October 1855, 3. 
17 Letter from ‘Old Colonist’ of Napier, Southern Cross, 23 December 1856, 3. 
18 Hawke’s Bay Herald, 21 November 1857, 2. 
19 It has also been ignored by some Otago historians; for instance, Erik Olssen 
includes only two brief mentions of Southland Province, the latter of which 
incorrectly states it seceded in 1860, in A History of Otago (Dunedin: John 
McIndoe, 1984), 63 and 239. 
20 Otago Witness, 2 February 1856, 3 
21 Otago Witness, 13 December 1856, 2. 
22 B.E. Dickinson, ‘The Ungentle Shepherds’, Journal of the Nelson Historical Society 
3, no. 4 (September 1978): 36. 
23 Nelson Examiner, 25 April 1857, 2, especially the pro-secession comments by 
Thomas Renwick, Member of the Provincial Council. 
24 Jim McAloon, Nelson: A Regional History (Whatamango Bay: Cape Catley, 
1997), 70-71. 
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Upon parliament’s receipt of petitions requesting secession, Premier 
Edward Stafford and his centralist ministry seized the opportunity. 
The centralists were increasingly frustrated with the power of the 
provinces; William Swainson, a member of the upper house and 
former crown colony attorney-general, wrote that ‘instead of drawing 
together and uniting the Colonists in the various and widely 
separated Settlements, the new Constitution rather tended to 
perpetuate their isolation’. 25  On this issue, the centralists had a 
powerful ally—Governor Thomas Gore Browne. He feared that 
‘government will fall entirely into the hands of the provincial 
authorities’ if the central government did not assert its authority, and 
therefore ‘New Zealand will be divided into six insignificant colonies’ 
rather than becoming a strong, united colony. 26  This attitude 
underpinned the New Provinces Act. By allowing the provinces to be 
divided into smaller, more localised units, the centralists could both 
restrain provincial power and emphasise the General Assembly’s 
superiority. 
 
The ministry also drafted the act to clip the wings of their political 
opponents, New Zealand’s ultra-provincialists. The ‘ultras’, as they 
were often known, were led in the House of Representatives by two 
Wellingtonians: William Fox, who was Stafford’s brief predecessor as 
premier and a believer in a federal system, and the cantankerous Isaac 
Featherston, Wellington Province’s superintendent. D.G. Herron 
argues persuasively that centralism and provincialism were 
determined less by ideology and more on the basis of whether a 
politician held central or provincial office, and the Wellington ultras 
dominated their province’s politics while enjoying little success in 
securing control of the central government.27 Whether or not self-
interest motivated the centralist/provincialist divide, what is 
important in this article is that the divide was very real and guided 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 William Swainson, New Zealand and Its Colonization (London: Smith, Elder and 
Co., 1859), 304. 
26 Thomas Gore Browne to Sir William Molesworth, 14 February 1856, British 
Parliamentary Papers: Colonies – New Zealand, vol. 10 (Shannon: Irish University 
Press, 1969), 459-60. 
27 D.G. Herron, ‘Provincialism and Centralism, 1853-1858’, in Studies of a Small 
Democracy: Essays in Honour of Willis Airey, ed. Robert Chapman and Keith 
Sinclair (Hamilton: Paul’s Book Arcade for the University of Auckland, 1963), 
20-25 passim. 
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the actions of politicians in 1858. Stafford was a moderate himself, 
but important allies within and without the ministry were ardent 
centralists, foremost being Colonial Secretary C.W. Richmond of 
Taranaki. His province was the smallest, most troubled, and most 
dependent on a strong central government; he himself was an 
intelligent, talented lawyer. Unsurprisingly, he emerged as a key 
architect of the New Provinces Act. 
 
Richmond originally proposed a sub-provincial system of counties or 
municipalities for outlying hinterlands, but was handed on a platter 
the opportunity to carve up the provinces when Wellington’s ultras 
failed to attend the 1858 session of the central parliament. 
Wellington Province’s politics were mired in a protracted partisan 
dispute between the council and superintendent, and the ultras 
considered it to be more important than the expense and 
inconvenience of travelling to Auckland for the central parliament.28 
Richmond could not believe his luck. The municipal system in the 
first draft of the bill quickly evolved into new provinces. Publicly, he 
explained the evolution by dismissing municipalities as vague and 
poorly defined bodies.29 Privately, he was much more frank, not to 
mention surprised by his success. In a letter to his uncle in England, 
he explained that: 
 
It is part of our policy, by multiplying provinces, to bring provincial 
powers within their due limits. When the size of the provinces is 
reduced they will necessarily confine themselves to local interests, 
leaving the general interests to the Gen[era]l Government... 
Considering the strength of Ultra Provincial feeling in N.Z. I am 
perfectly astonished at the amount of success we have achieved in our 
reactionary policy. The leading Wellington politicians have been 
absent & there will be a dreadful howl of rage & grief from that 
quarter when they learn what we have done.30 
Put simply, the ministry’s policy was to divide and rule the provinces. 
The act made secession an automatic process upon the presentation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Wellington Independent, 20 March 1858, 2 and 1 September 1858, 5. 
29 Southern Cross, 13 August 1858, 3. 
30 C.W. Richmond to T. Richmond, 23 August 1858, in The Richmond Atkinson 
Papers, vol. 1, ed. Guy Scholefield (Wellington: R.E. Owen, Government 
Printer, 1960), 418-19. 
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of an electors’ petition that satisfied certain criteria. Any region with 
a town (to be capital), a port, a population of at least one thousand 
Pakeha, and a total land area between half a million and three million 
acres could petition for secession. If these requirements were met and 
the petition was signed by over 150 registered electors, representing 
at least three-fifths of the region’s electoral roll, secession would be 
granted without even the need to consult the old province.31 Thus any 
province with a significant hinterland population was put in a 
precarious position—if a secession petition met the New Province 
Act’s criteria, there was no protest mechanism available to the old 
province. Although superficially an expansion of the provincial 
system may appear to foster provincial sentiment and encourage very 
regionalised identities, its framers conceived it as a method of 
reducing the scope, authority, and security of the provinces. Did they 
succeed? 
 
The new provinces proved to be weak entities that vividly displayed 
all the flaws of the provincial system. Although Hawke’s Bay did not 
totally disgrace itself, it was the first province to secure an overdraft32 
and its politics were defined by bitter infighting amongst the local 
elite. 33  Far worse befell Marlborough and Southland, which both 
became bywords for provincial ineptitude and failure. Although they 
had considerable ambitions, they struggled to make any actual 
achievements and were often bogged down in bitter intra-provincial 
strife. Marlborough aspired to public works that it simply could not 
afford. Within two months of secession from Nelson, proposals for 
roads and railways were the subject of sometimes heated debate, with 
particular emphasis on linking Picton, the province’s port, and 
Blenheim, the province’s commercial centre and initial capital. 34 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 New Provinces Act (21 and 22 Victoria 1858, No. 70), in the New Zealand Legal 
Information Institute’s database of New Zealand Acts As Enacted, available from: 
http://www.nzlii.org/nz/legis/hist_act/; accessed 19 June 2012. 
32 Hawke’s Bay Herald, 18 August 1860, 6. 
33 Matthew Wright, Hawke’s Bay: The History of a Province (Palmerston North: 
Dunmore Press, 1994), 68-69. This book’s title is a classic example of the misuse 
of ‘province’ in New Zealand historiography; it is the history of Hawke’s Bay 
region, with relatively little attention given to the working of its provincial 
government between 1858 and 1876. It is much more of a history of change 
among the region’s middle class. 
34 Marlborough Press, 6 January 1860, 3; 20 January 1860, 3; 27 January 1860, 3; 2 
March 1860, 3; 14 April 1860, 3. 
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Never mind that at the time the province was so small that, in the 
words of its first newspaper, the Marlborough Press, Blenheim was a 
quiet settlement in the country making ‘rapid strides towards the 
appearance of a town. Houses are still going up, extending the street 
lines.’35 The population of the entire province was a paltry 1,151.36 
 
Hopelessly ambitious, Marlborough’s provincial government 
introduced a railway bill in 1861 authorising a loan of £60,000 to 
fund construction. The Marlborough Press cajoled support for it and 
was the loudest voice amidst a chorus of railway boosters. The railway 
was not to be a profitable enterprise; it would be constructed by the 
government as trustee for the people and operated for the public 
benefit.37 Opposition to the scheme was characterised as distasteful, 
since railway proposals ‘ought to have united every well-wisher to the 
province in its favour’.38 Neither the Marlborough Press nor any of the 
railway’s other supporters, however, clarified how the government 
would afford this form of public charity except with vague references 
to hypothetical future prosperity and income from the sale of public 
land that might follow. 
 
Unsurprisingly, the bill failed. Although it passed the Marlborough 
provincial council, Gore Browne had expanded his power of veto over 
financial bills in May 1857. He issued a circular requiring all 
provincial loan bills to be reserved for his consent after Wellington 
Province brazenly thwarted his authority by raising and spending a 
loan before he could veto it.39 Gore Browne’s power was strengthened 
later that year when the Colonial Office endorsed his actions and 
instructed him not to approve provincial loans except for temporary 
or emergency measures.40 These instructions were not consistently 
enforced, but in 1861 they proved tremendously convenient, as it was 
obvious Marlborough could not repay so large a loan and that would 
threaten New Zealand’s financial standing in England. On behalf of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Marlborough Press, 9 March 1860, 3. 
36 Marlborough: A Provincial History, ed. A.D. McIntosh (Christchurch: Capper 
Press, 1977 [1940]), 208. Specific author details for individual chapters are not 
given. 
37 Marlborough Press, 25 May 1861, 2. 
38 Marlborough Press, 8 June 1861, 2. 
39 Southern Cross, 5 May 1857, 3 and Wellington Independent, 3 June 1857, 2. 
40 Henry Labouchere to Thomas Gore Browne, 15 September 1857, published in 
the Otago Witness, 16 January 1858, 7. 
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Gore Browne, Premier William Fox, ironically one of Wellington’s 
ultras, wrote to inform the superintendent of Marlborough that, 
under the instructions of 1857, the loan could not be authorised.41 In 
the process, Fox criticised the province’s marked lack of financial 
data—their figures for expected returns and for maintenance 
expenditure were purely conjectural. This was not the end of the 
matter: another proposal was entertained in 1865. 42  It too was 
unsuccessful, and the truth of the matter was that Marlborough’s 
ambitions were ludicrous. Its income was so unstable and meagre that 
the expense of government buildings and salaries consumed revenue 
at the expense of the most basic public works.43 
 
Worse for Marlburians, a ridiculous spat between Picton and 
Blenheim politicians had been wasting government money and did 
more than anything else to ruin trust in Marlborough’s ability to 
govern itself competently. The provincial council was more 
dysfunctional and acrimonious than any other in New Zealand, 
hosting an unending series of controversies that have been thoroughly 
studied in the history of Marlborough edited by A.D. McIntosh.44 
The two most dramatic disputes, both over the location of the 
province’s capital, warrant particular attention here as they inflicted 
damage upon the reputation of the provincial system and illustrate 
just how petty and unworkable the new provinces were. When the 
province was founded, Picton was intended as its capital, but it 
existed more on paper than in reality and Blenheim was the de facto 
first capital. A fierce rivalry erupted between the two towns. 
Proposals to erect public buildings in Blenheim led to an acrimonious 
debate about whether the cost of construction would be better spent 
on other public works; the obvious subtext was that Blenheim sought 
to secure itself permanently as the capital by providing buildings for 
the government before Picton could.45 No resolution was reached 
until April 1861, when the government formally relocated to Picton.46 
The relocation only made the rivalry more bitter; Blenheim took it as 
an affront while Picton jealously guarded its status as capital. In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Nelson Examiner, 23 October 1861, 4. 
42 Marlborough Press, 27 May 1865, 2. 
43 Hokitika Times, quoted in Colonist, 10 June 1865, 1. 
44 Marlborough, ed. McIntosh, 207-272 passim. 
45 Marlborough Press, 30 June 1860, 2-3. 
46 Marlborough Press, 13 April 1861, 2. 
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September 1862, the provincial council descended into farce when 
two men made competing claims to be the duly elected 
superintendent, one representing Picton and the other Blenheim; 
supporters of the latter took advantage of the chaos by attempting to 
remove the capital back to Blenheim.47 They were unsuccessful and 
the deadlock was only resolved with a dissolution of the council. 
 
Despite the animosity of 1860-62, it was in 1865 that Marlborough’s 
politics reached their lowest ebb. In late June, a new session of the 
provincial council was opened in Picton and almost immediately 
erupted into a debate about whether the superintendent had the 
exclusive right to determine where the council met or if the council 
could decide any issue put before it. The Blenheim members, in the 
majority by eleven to nine, carried a vote to adjourn and hold the next 
meeting at Blenheim’s court house.48 The superintendent, in whom 
the constitution vested ultimate authority to fix the council’s meeting 
place, ignored the vote and summoned the council to meet again in 
Picton. Blenheim’s representatives ignored the summons, held their 
own session concurrently in Blenheim, marched on the 
superintendent’s session in Picton, and attempted to substitute their 
own minutes into the record.49 To compound the scene’s indignity, 
the Blenheim members were hooted by a mob inside the council 
chambers and pelted with stones outside.50 Little wonder the province 
was viewed as a joke externally. The Press of Christchurch captured 
the popular impression: ‘Marlborough, in the absence of any other 
mode of achieving fame, resolves to do so by making itself infinitely 
ridiculous’.51 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47  Wellington Independent, 30 September 1862, 2 and Nelson Examiner, 1 
November 1862, 3. At the opening of the 1862 session of the Marlborough 
provincial council, the members were to elect a superintendent as the new 
provinces—unlike the original six—did not have a separate, popularly elected 
superintendent. William Baillie, the previous superintendent, was aware he did 
not have the numbers to secure re-election and prorogued the council 
immediately before the vote on a superintendent. The council ignored his 
prorogation and elected William Eyes as Superintendent. Baillie did not 
recognise the proceedings, refused to hand over the keys to the superintendent’s 
office, and locked Eyes and his supporters out of the council chambers. 
48 Marlborough Press, 28 June 1865, 2. 
49 Marlborough Press, 8 July 1865, 2. 
50 Marlborough News, cited in Nelson Examiner, 20 July 1865, 4. 
51 Press, 18 July 1865, 2. 
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Marlborough may have become absurd, but Southland condemned 
the provincial system further by actually going bankrupt. It got off to 
a poor start when Otago politicians, vigorously opposed to their 
province being dismembered, ensured that the new province received 
the smallest possible territory.52 Southland was also the victim of its 
own extraordinarily bad timing, seceding from Otago weeks before 
Gabriel Read struck gold in May 1861 and began the Otago gold 
rush. These two factors need not have been condemnations; it was 
Southland’s own actions that turned a bad situation into one of New 
Zealand history’s most laughably embarrassing episodes. The 
Southland provincial council from an early date began entertaining 
two railway schemes: one linking the port of Bluff to Invercargill, the 
capital, and another from Invercargill to Lake Wakatipu in Central 
Otago to tap the gold rush.53 A railway was seen as essential to 
capture goldfields trade from Dunedin as the swampy land around 
Invercargill made road construction difficult and all previous attempts 
to construct an all-weather winter road had ended in abject failure.54 
Never mind that not a single kilometre of railway had yet opened in 
New Zealand and the colony lacked appropriate engineering 
experience. In 1863, as the gold rush reached fever pitch and trade 
was slipping away, Southland’s chief surveyor was woefully optimistic 
about the ease of construction. As procuring steel rails from England 
would take too long, he foolishly endorsed a plan to build the line 
from Invercargill to Lake Wakatipu with wooden rails.55 
 
The railway scheme imploded spectacularly. The province did not 
have the means to build a line eighty-three miles to Lake Wakatipu; 
instead, it opened eight short miles to Makarewa. In constructing 
these eight miles, poor quality wood was used. Ordinary citizens were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 A.H. McLintock, The History of Otago: The Origins and Growth of a Wakefield 
Class Settlement (Dunedin: Otago Centennial Historical Publications, 1949), 410-
11. 
53 See, for instance, the superintendent’s speech opening the second session of the 
first council of Southland, 17 January 1862, in Votes and Proceedings of the 
Southland Provincial Council 1861-69, 16. 
54 J.O.P. Watt, Southland’s Pioneer Railways 1864-1878 (Wellington: New Zealand 
Railway and Locomotive Society, 1965), 14-15. 
55 Preliminary report from Theophilus Heale, chief surveyor, to J.A.R. Menzies, 
superintendent, regarding the Northern Railway, 31 July 1863, Menzies Papers, 
Alexander Turnbull Library, MS Papers 0055-03. 
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alienated by the grand public opening to Makarewa when only 
invited guests were permitted to travel on the train and partake in the 
full range of festivities.56 A week later, a second public opening was 
held in response to popular discontent, but it was preceded by a bad 
omen: the first death of a New Zealand railway worker, when a 
teenage employee was crushed beneath a train shunting in Makarewa 
three days before the public celebrations.57 The line itself proved to be 
manifestly unsuited to traffic; afternoon rainfall made it almost 
impossible for the train to run on the clay-covered wood. Some 
travellers trudged back to Invercargill on foot, damp and tired; others 
were forced to stay the night in Makarewa.58 The railway was not up 
to operational requirements and money was not available to fix it. 
Expenses already exceeded the amount borrowed to fund 
construction, while provincial revenue for 1864 had fallen 
catastrophically short—Southland had anticipated almost £99,000 in 
revenue but had raised barely more than £52,000.59 Consequently, the 
railway was rarely operational for the rest of the 1860s. Its brief 
operational periods were marred by problems with locomotives that 
were unreliable, too heavy for the wooden rails, and incapable of 
pulling more than the smallest load.60 
 
The Invercargill to Bluff line was built with iron rather than wooden 
rails and proved to be more functional, but the cost of both sections 
was too much for the province to bear. In the province’s west, the 
people of Riverton were scathing. Riverton had been founded before 
Invercargill and resented the shift of Southland’s power; it had 
aspired to the status of capital and principal port. Despite being 
overlooked for the capital and superseded by Bluff’s port, Riverton 
remained economically important and its citizens took a very dim 
view of how Southland’s public works revolved around Invercargill’s 
interests; staunch localism came to divide even the new provinces.61 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Southland Times, 20 October 1864, 2. 
57 Southland Times, 25 October 1864, 2. 
58 Southland Times, 27 October 1864, 2. 
59 Statement of accounts, Province of Southland, for the eight months ending 30 
September 1864, Menzies Papers, Alexander Turnbull Library, MS Papers 0055-
03. 
60 Watt, Southland’s Pioneer Railways, 30. 
61  Erik Olssen, ‘The Peopling of Southland’ and ‘Loyalty and Localism – 
Southland’s Political Odyssey’, both in Murihiku: The Southland Story, ed. Paul 
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The Riverton Times feared that reckless railway expenditure by 
Invercargill would ruin Southland. It could even cite some 
Invercargill politicians siding with their viewpoint, William Tarlton 
having pronounced in 1863 that Southland ‘would never be ruined 
but in and through its provincial council’.62 He was dead right. The 
railway was ill-conceived, poorly built, opened too late for the gold 
rush, effectively non-operational, and never came close to diverting 
trade from Otago. It did not reach Kingston, on the banks of Lake 
Wakatipu, until 1878, two years after the demise of the provinces. 
Instead, the expense sent Southland bankrupt. In 1870, Southland’s 
failure was so absolute that, with tail firmly between its legs, it 
rejoined Otago. Never had the provincial project looked so decrepit. 
 
As Marlborough bickered and Southland collapsed, most of the other 
provinces stumbled too. Canterbury alone completed a grand public 
work. It opened New Zealand’s first public railway on 1 December 
1863 between Christchurch and a temporary wharf at Ferrymead, 
and then four years later completed a significant railway tunnel 
through the Port Hills to connect Christchurch with the deep-water 
port of Lyttelton. Wellington Province could not even construct an 
all-weather road across the Rimutaka Range to link Wellington city 
with the fertile Wairarapa hinterland, let alone undertake the railway 
proposals it occasionally entertained.63 Auckland Province’s attempt 
to build a railway south from Auckland city to the Waikato region 
was abandoned amidst severe public allegations of financial 
incompetence.64 Taranaki and Hawke’s Bay, small and troubled by 
the Land Wars of the 1860s, could not spare much time or money to 
develop their economies. 
 
One of the most striking examples of the failure of the provincial 
model of development was the petty inter-provincial jealousy that 
scuppered proposals to build a bridge over the dangerous Waitaki 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Sorrell (Invercargill: Southland to 2006 Book Committee of the Dan Davin 
Literary Foundation, 2006), 73 and 86. 
62 Riverton Times, 20 February 1864, 2. 
63 One railway proposal was even given the provincial council’s approval; see the 
Wellington Independent, 3 July 1866, 6. An inability to raise the necessary funds 
meant construction never began. 
64 Daily Southern Cross, 17 August 1867, 3. The DSC was a consistent advocate of 
the railway but it turned viciously on the provincial council for failing to complete 
the project or even bring a truncated section into operation. 
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River. Many travellers had drowned in the Waitaki, but as it formed 
the border between Canterbury and Otago, proposals to bridge it 
failed. The provincial councils were incapable of reaching an 
agreement on who would fund it, and in 1866, the issue exploded 
into an editorial dispute between two key regional newspapers that 
exposed the main fault lines. The Oamaru Times, representing the 
interests of North Otago and some settlers in Canterbury’s Waimate 
region along the Waitaki, believed that a bridge would encourage 
inter-provincial trade and boost land sales near the river in both 
provinces. 65  The Timaru Herald, on the other hand, represented 
South Canterbury’s commercial interests, especially those connected 
with Timaru’s port. It opposed the bridge, fearing it would divert 
trade from Waimate to Oamaru rather than Timaru. 66  Further 
divisions of the country into new, hyper-regionalised provinces would 
only make inter-provincial jealousies such as these worse. Intra-
provincial development was stagnating due to poor financial 
management; inter-provincial development was stunted by narrow 
self-interest. As the Oamaru Times editorialised, there was popular 
dissatisfaction with the ‘petty provincial jealousies which are so apt, 
ever and anon, to stand out in repulsive relief, when questions 
involving the welfare of the country generally are discussed’.67 
 
As the provincial model of development faltered, settlers increasingly 
looked to the central government for redress. The Anglosphere, of 
which New Zealand was the most far-flung outpost, was undergoing 
rapid development and growth. It was fuelled by what James Belich 
calls the ‘progress industry’: the interaction of immigration, easy 
credit, speculative markets, and the rapid creation of towns and 
public infrastructure.68 Yet the provinces, especially the new ones, had 
come to impede the progress industry. They had largely failed to 
provide public works and their financial difficulties made credit more 
difficult to obtain. To avoid any more debacles like those in 
Marlborough and Southland, the New Provinces Act was essentially 
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repealed by another act of the same name in 1865.69 No longer could 
a region secede through an essentially automatic process; the creation 
of a new province had to be authorised on its merits by a vote of the 
central parliament. This did not stop hinterlands campaigning for 
secession, but only one additional province was created: Westland, 
the site of another gold rush. It was first made an autonomous county 
of Canterbury in 1868, and when it had proven its ability to govern 
itself, it was upgraded to the status of a fully fledged province in 
1873. Other hinterlands, unable to secede, increasingly sought central 
rather than provincial support for their development, while in 
provincial capitals, enemies of provincial regimes were only too keen 
to neuter the provinces. 
 
The 1860s had shown New Zealand that new provinces were not the 
answer to hinterland unrest, that many provinces—especially the 
newest—were incapable of performing the basic tasks of colonisation, 
and that a new form of development was necessary. What many did 
not expect was how quickly the provincial system would disappear. In 
1870, Julius Vogel, the young treasurer of William Fox’s government, 
proposed a scheme that would obliterate the provinces. Vogel and 
Fox were unlikely men for the job, as neither were centralists—Fox 
had been a committed ultra, while Vogel had fervently advocated 
Otago becoming a separate colony during the 1860s. Yet Vogel was 
more enamoured by the potential of technological advances than he 
was with specific forms of government, and Fox let his treasurer work 
independently to create the Great Public Works Programme.70 Under 
its auspices, public works and immigration became the responsibility 
of the central government rather than the provinces. The 
programme’s key project was a national railway network linking all 
major centres via trunk routes across provincial borders. 71  New 
Zealand would not fall victim to Australia’s proliferation of different 
railway gauges. The programme required an investment of ten 
million pounds, a sum far beyond the ability of any province to raise 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69  New Provinces Act (29 Victoria 1865, No. 34), in the New Zealand Legal 
Information Institute’s database of New Zealand Acts As Enacted, available from: 
http://www.nzlii.org/nz/legis/hist_act/; accessed 19 June 2012. 
70 Raewyn Dalziel, Julius Vogel: Business Politician (Auckland: Auckland University 
Press, 1986), especially 80 and 104. 
71 Vogel’s speech introducing the programme and outlining his vision for a national 
railway network can be found in the Evening Post, 29 June 1870, 2. 
              André D.E. Brett 
147   
or repay—but within the abilities of the increasingly powerful central 
government. 
 
As plans advanced, it was clear the provinces had lost their main role. 
The compression of physical time and space by the railway—and by 
the steamship—also compressed the space within which the 
provinces existed. The progress industry had progressed beyond the 
need for provincial administration. New Zealanders looked to the 
central government to provide for public needs and wants; the 
provinces—poor, robbed of their job, and embarrassed by the new 
provinces debacle—were no longer wanted. Politicians began 
campaigning on platforms advocating abolition. 72  First came 
suggestions in 1873 that the North Island provinces be abolished but 
the South Island provinces be retained, a sop to the gold rush and 
pastoral wealth of Canterbury and Otago. This led logically to 
proposals for outright abolition; ‘the storm has apparently gathered 
rapidly and broken on us suddenly, [but] the elements of it have in 
fact been gathering in the political atmosphere for years’.73 When a 
plan was put forward in 1875 to abolish the provinces, entrust nation-
building to the central government alone, and form a system of 
counties and single-purpose boards for local affairs, it progressed 
easily through parliament. Even four superintendents voted for it.74 A 
majority of New Zealanders elected pro-abolition politicians, and 
outside prosperous Otago, few were sad to see the provinces go. 
Thus, the design of C.W. Richmond succeeded beyond his goals. 
The New Provinces Act did not just limit the power of the provinces; 
it embarrassed the system so absolutely that the new provinces were a 
major factor in provincial abolition. Unable to achieve their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 See, for instance, Hugh Lusk, who ran for the superintendency of Auckland in 
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Taranaki, and Westland voted in favour of abolition; the superintendents of 
Auckland, Canterbury, Otago, and Wellington voted against; the superintendent 
of Marlborough was absent in England. 
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aspirations, they devolved into pathetic arguments and fiscal 
insolvency. Their peers, the original provinces, fared little better. 
Settlers in new and old provinces alike came to see the central 
government as the authority most able to cater to their needs. No 
longer were the provinces necessary, especially in a country 
progressively being linked by rail. Eighteen years after the New 
Provinces Act ostensibly extended the provincial project to all 
communities who aspired to the status of ‘province’, the forces it 
unleashed caused the demise of New Zealand’s sole attempt at 
federalism. 
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